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Reviving Rylands: How the Doctrine Could Be Used
to Claim Compensation for Environmental Damages
Caused by Fracking
Róisín Áine Costello
Contemporary societies are characterized by complex
interdependence, with industrial activity increasingly
having the potential to cause effects beyond local and
national borders. Courts have previously illustrated
that liability for injurious action must lie with the indi-
vidual who created the risk of damage under the
common law rule of Rylands v. Fletcher. Having fallen
out of favour in the twentieth century, this article pro-
poses a re-articulation of the rule to cover situations in
modern society in which invasive methods are used in
the extraction of volatile fuels from the earth, specifi-
cally in the case of ‘fracking’. The article examines
recent rulings from the United States and the United
Kingdom, as well as precedent from the United
Kingdom and Ireland to establish the manner in which
the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher might be successfully
rearticulated in the context of contemporary common
law jurisdictions – specifically focusing on Ireland –
as a means for redressing environmental damage.
INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly interdependent society, ultimate
liability for injury or damage arising from industry
should lie with those who engage in the potentially inju-
rious activity. Common law courts have previously
illustrated that, insofar as society approves of the dis-
tribution of burdens of responsibility to certain indi-
viduals or groups, liability for injurious action must lie
with the individual who created the risk of damage.
However, the increasingly invasive methods used in the
extraction of volatile fuels from the earth, particularly
through ‘fracking’, pose significant challenges to bal-
ancing the protection of the environment and the prop-
erty rights of individuals with conditions that do not
stifle industry.
This article will examine attempts to regulate this new
industry and will seek to locate ‘fracking’ within the
constellation of activities with potentially negative envi-
ronmental implications that should be accorded strict
liability status under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.1
The article will undertake a comparative evaluation
of the laws and regulations governing fracking in place
in the common law jurisdictions in which Rylands first
emerged and enjoyed general application – namely the
United Kingdom, Australia and Ireland.
The article first defines fracking and examines its emer-
gence and current use both in the United States and
Europe. It then outlines the emergence of the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher, its uses and adoption throughout
common law jurisdictions and its decline in use during
the late twentieth century. The article next considers
the case of Dimock, Pennsylvania, as a specific example
of situations in which fracking may lead to a cause of
action under the rule in Rylands. Finally, the article
turns to Ireland as an example of the current legal and
regulatory context of fuel extraction laws in common
law jurisdictions, and speculates as to the potential
revival of the rule in Rylands to cover damages sus-
tained as a result of the escape of fracking fluids in
Ireland and, thus in other common law jurisdictions.
WHAT IS FRACKING?
Hydraulic fracturing or ‘fracking’ involves the injection
of large quantities of water, sand and chemicals (usually
a significant quantity of which is methane) deep into
the ground at high pressure in order to force small,
dispersed gas deposits to the surface where they are
extracted and stored.2 Fracking has proved controver-
sial and has been the subject of study in respect to its
potential environmental consequences.3 Such conse-
quences potentially include pollution of groundwater
1 Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] UKHL 1.
2 For a brief explanation of fracking, see BBC, ‘What is Fracking: The
Process Explained in 15 Seconds’, BBC News (13 December 2012),
found at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20710481>. Gas extracted
through fracking is commonly referred to as ‘shale gas’.
3 BBC, ‘What is Fracking and Why is It Controversial?’, BBC News
(27 June 2013), found at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
14432401>. A recent poll carried out by The Economist, supported by
Statoil found that 51% of those surveyed disagreed with the state-
ment that the benefits derived from shale gas outweigh the draw-
backs of hydraulic fracturing., See ‘Join the Debate’, The Economist
(2 March 2013), found at: <http://www.economist.com/debate/
overview/246>.
Toppan Best-set Premedia Limitedbs_bs_query
Journal Code: REEL Proofreader: Mony




































































































RECIEL •• (••) 2014. ISSN 2050-0386
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
1
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 2 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Tue Jan 21 18:58:02 2014
/Xpp84/wiley_journal/REEL/reel_v0_i0/reel_12059update
and land by the chemicals used in fracking fluids.4
Although fracking fluid is typically more than 99%
water and sand, the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency cautions that 2–5 million gallons of
water may be necessary to extract the gas or oil in any
one operation, and the extractor must thus use tens of
thousands of gallons of hazardous chemicals in a single
well, much of which will remain deep in the earth after
the gas is forced to the surface.5 Other concerns include
fracking’s potential to cause earth tremors – a concern
evidenced in recent seismic activity near a test well in
Britain.6
In the United States, shale gas extracted through the
fracking process has had a significant impact on the
energy market, with production reaching 4.9 trillion
cubic feet (a quarter of the country’s total gas output)
since 2000.7 Europe, too, has considerable reserves
(some 639 trillion cubic feet); however, these remain
largely untapped.8 It is contended that one of the
primary reasons for this continental imbalance in
extraction levels is America’s lengthy history of fuel
exploitation, which has fostered an innovative and
competitive fuel services industry. In comparison,
Europe has few infrastructural or human resources
engaged in the energy sector, barring some countries’
offshore activities in the North Sea.
America’s competitive market has also driven down
costs. Deutsche Bank has estimated a single gas well in
Europe could cost US$14 million to sink – three-and-
a-half times more than its American equivalent.9 Low
costs in America are aided by the less overt regulation
the American industry faces, as well as Europe’s lack of
large-scale distribution frameworks and open-access
rules, making it less attractive and amenable to devel-
opments in fuel extraction.10 It is thus unsurprising that
in 2008, at the height of gas extraction activity, 1,600
rigs were in operation in North America while in
Europe there were fewer than 150.11
However, the disparity in exploitation of shale gas
deposits may be changing. Poland, which potentially
possesses Europe’s largest deposits of shale gas, has
sunk test wells and estimates that commercial produc-
tion will begin in 2014.12 France, which potentially has
reserves similar to Poland, has imposed a moratorium
on fracking while potential dangers are assessed.13
French concerns over environmental impacts may be
greater than those of their American counterparts due
to the region’s high population density and the atten-
dant risk of greater disruption to citizens and a greater
pool of potential victims were incidents to occur.
The legal framework at play with respect to fuel extrac-
tion is also of fundamental relevance in the imbalance
in the use of fracking. In the United States, mineral
rights are the property of the landowner while in
Europe such rights are generally held by the State.14
Thus, while American landowners see potential profit,
Europeans may not realize the same level of personal
gain from discovery and exploitation. In Ireland, for
example, individuals with rights to land where oil or gas
deposits exist are entitled to one third of the value of
the fuel extracted.15 Standard American leases oblige
extraction firms to continue production regardless of
market prices; as a result, landowners continue to
receive royalties regardless of the driller turning a
profit.16 In Europe, no such standard provisions exist.
Although this may paint an unpromising picture for the
future of potential fracking industries in Europe, this
is not the case. Europeans have reason to be equally
concerned as their American counterparts about the
security of their energy supply, and its political and
economic cost. Currently, many European countries
buy gas from Russia – a country whose influence many
in Europe would be content to see reduced or removed
through securing alternate energy sources. Indeed,
such concerns may play a part in Poland, as well as in
Ukraine’s haste to embrace shale gas exploration and
energy independence. They may also lead others, such
as Ireland, to begin fracking in order to meet goals for
reducing dependency on foreign energy.
4 D.C. Holzman, ‘Methane Found in Well Water Near Fracking Sites’,
119:7 Environmental Health Perspectives (2011), 289.
5 Bureau of Oil and Gas Regulation, New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation, Preliminary Revised Draft Supplemen-
tal Generic Environmental Impact Statement on the Oil and Gas and
Mining Regulatory Program (2009), found at: <http://www.dec.ny.gov/
data/dmn/ogprdsgeisfull.pdf>, Chapter 6; United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development,
Hydraulic Fracturing Research Study (2010), at 1.
6 M. McCarthy, ‘Fracking for Gas Allowed in UK Despite Earth-
quakes’, The Independent (17 April 2012), found at: <http://www
.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/fracking-for-gas-allowed-in-
uk-despite-earthquakes-7648265.html>.
7 By 2035 the proportion could rise to half. See ‘Shale Gas in Europe
and America: Fracking Here, Fracking There’, The Economist (26
November 2011) (‘Fracking Here, Fracking There’).
8 H. Rogers, ‘Shale Gas: The Unfolding Story’, 27:1 Oxford Review of
Economic Policy (2011), 117, at 118; ‘The Hunt for Shale Gas in
Europe’, The Economist (3 December 2009) (‘The Hunt for Shale
Gas’).
9 ‘The Hunt for Shale Gas’, n. 8 above.
10 Ibid.
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THE RULE IN RYLANDS
V. FLETCHER
THE CASE THAT GAVE RISE TO
THE RULE
The facts of the case from which the rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher emerged were as follows. Rylands employed
contractors to build a reservoir, during the construction
of which the contractors discovered a series of disused
coal shafts underneath Rylands’ land. The contractors
chose to continue work rather than backfilling the
shafts. Shortly after being filled, the reservoir built for
Rylands burst and the water having escaped into the
shafts below flooded a neighbouring mine, run by
Fletcher, causing damage subsequent to which Fletcher
brought an action under negligence. The case on being
heard by the court of first instance was resolved in
favour of Rylands,17 though one judge of the court in a
dissenting judgment argued that Fletcher had the right
to enjoy his land free of interference from water, and
that as a result the defendant was guilty of trespass and
nuisance. This dissenting argument was affirmed on
appeal by both the Court of Exchequer and the House of
Lords, holding that where the occupier of land accrues
on it an unnatural substance which then escapes
causing damage to the land of another, he will be liable
for the damage caused subsequent to such escape.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE
The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher18 has subsequently been
recognized as a cause of action in its own right in
common law. The rule imposes strict liability upon an
owner or occupier of land who introduces to, and keeps
on, their land anything liable to do damage if it
escapes.19 The rule’s aim, as stated in Transco plc v.
Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council,20 is to
require an entrepreneur to provide by insurance or
compensation for the risks their enterprise creates, on
the basis that their use of land be non-natural, extraor-
dinary or unusual.21 This duty’s aim – to insure against
consequences, remote as well as proximate, attached to
the original act of bringing into existence conditions
which might eventually do harm – has been criticized
and led to the doctrine’s fall out of favour during the
twentieth century.
Rylands v. Fletcher has been disclaimed in various
jurisdictions, including Australia, where the High Court
chose to extinguish the doctrine’s use in their courts
with their ruling of Burnie Port Authority v. General
Jones Pty Ltd.22 Within England and Wales, however,
Rylands remains valid, although unfavoured, law
according to the decisions in Cambridge Water Co Ltd
v. Eastern Counties Leather plc23 and Transco.24 Cam-
bridge Water altered the rule by establishing the prin-
ciple that nuisance claims under Rylands v. Fletcher
must include a requirement that the damage be fore-
seeable, with the court further suggesting Rylands was
in fact a sub-set of nuisance as opposed to an indepen-
dent tort.25
The facts of Cambridge Water Company are salient in
relation to the potential application of Rylands to the
escape of fracking fluid. Cambridge Water was respon-
sible for providing water to the inhabitants of Cam-
bridge and the surrounding areas. In 1976, they
purchased a borehole to meet rising water demands. It
was subsequently found that the borehole had levels of
perchloroethene (PCE) exceeding those allowed under
European regulations. The PCE was found to have
originated in a tannery owned by Eastern Counties
Leather.
Cambridge Water thus argued that Eastern Counties
Leather was liable in three ways: first, in negligence;
second, in nuisance; and third, under the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher. In the High Court, the judge dis-
missed all three of the company’s claims, noting that for
negligence and nuisance, the damage had to be reason-
ably foreseeable, per Overseas Tankship,26 and that in
this case the damage was not. On the third claim, the
court held that the use of industrial chemicals was not
‘non-natural’, given that it was on an industrial site and
that, for the claim to succeed under Rylands, the use
must be one bringing increased danger to others, and
not merely be the ordinary use of the land or a use
proper for the general benefit of the community.27 This
decision was overturned on appeal to the Court of
Appeal.
On appeal in the House of Lords, the ruling of the origi-
nal court – namely, that the rule under Rylands was
applicable and the plaintiff’s claim was successful – was
restored. The House of Lords noted in their judgment
that the Court of Appeal’s reliance on Ballard v. Tom-
linson28 was erroneous, and suggested that the case
17 Ibid.
18 Rylands v. Fletcher, n. 1 above.
19 Ibid., in the judgment of Lord Cranworth.
20 Transco plc v. Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council, [2003]
UKHL 61 (‘Transco’), at paragraph 29.
21 Ibid., at paragraph 11.
22 Burnie Port Authority v. General Jones Pty, [1994] 179 CLR 520.
23 Cambridge Water Co. Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc, [1994] 1
All ER 53 (‘Cambridge Water’).
24 Transco, n. 20 above.
25 A debate eventually laid to rest in Transco, ibid.
26 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co
Ltd., [1961] UKPC 1.
27 Ibid.
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should be distinguished on its facts.29 As a result, the
Lords held that the lower court had neither established
a rule that there was a right to clear water, nor that
there was strict liability attached to that right.30 The
court also noted, however, that there were similarities
between the principle of ‘non-natural use’ under
Rylands and that of the ‘reasonable user’ in nuisance. It
was therefore concluded that ‘it would lead to a more
coherent body of common law principles if the rule in
Rylands were to be regarded essentially as an extension
of the law of nuisance’.31
In the subsequent case of Transco, the court upheld the
rule in Rylands, though under strict limits as to what
constituted non-natural use. In this case, the plaintiff
took an action under Rylands for damages covering
repairs to one of its gas mains after the surrounding
ground had been washed away by the escape of signifi-
cant quantities of water from a leaking water pipe of the
council. In the House of Lords, the court held that the
escape of large volumes of water from an ordinary pipe
did not satisfy the criteria of Rylands, as the transport –
even of large quantities – of water was neither a dan-
gerous nor an unnatural use under the rule. As a result,
the council was not liable.32 In the context of environ-
mental law it is a potentially useful legal tool not only
for its application through strict liability, but also for
the fact that its application is not limited to adjoining
occupiers but extends to any person who sustains
damage because of the escape.33
ROADBLOCKS TO REVIVING
RYLANDS
Perhaps the most overt impediment to the application
of the doctrine in circumstances in which fracking is in
use can be found in the judgment by the House of Lords
in Transco:
[I]t is tempting to see, beneath the surface of the rule, a
policy of requiring the costs of a commercial enterprise to be
internalised; to require the entrepreneur to provide, by
insurance or otherwise, for the risks to others which his
enterprise creates.34
However, many have considered that the public interest
in promoting economic development made it undesir-
able to hold an entrepreneur liable when he had not
been negligent.35 More recently, the English case of
Stannard v. Gore36 has lent support to the hope that
Rylands may re-emerge as a remedy for damage and,
potentially, as a remedy effects of fracking leaks.37
Stannard concerned damage to the claimant’s land
caused by the ‘escape’ of a fire which spread through the
defendant’s premises, fed by the large stack of tyres
which the defendant had brought onto the land on
which he carried out the business of a motor vehicle
tyre supplier and fitter.
The court of first instance held that all requirements of
the rule in Rylands were satisfied and accordingly ruled
for the claimant. The defendant appealed, and the judge
delivered his ruling in the Court of Appeal that although
the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 limited a
defendant’s liability to non-accidental fires:38
[W]here a fire arose from something dangerous that the
defendant had brought onto his land there could be nothing
accidental about any fire that arose as a result, and what
became the rule in Rylands v Fletcher continued to apply
with full force, although of course it is the fire itself that is
the dangerous thing that escapes the defendant’s land,
rather than whatever caused the fire to arise in the first
place.39
Delivering his judgment, Lord Ward noted there was
thus ‘plainly an escape within the meaning of the
Rylands v. Fletcher rule’ and liability thus turned on
whether or not Stannard’s activities were dangerous
and a non-natural use of the land.40 Specifically relating
to the non-natural use requirement, Ward noted
storing and enlarging the tyre storage area was out of
the ordinary, was not normal and not routine and thus
satisfied the standard. However, two other members of
the court, applying the Transco precedent, agreed that
the rule in Rylands should not apply and that the court
of first instance had erred as it was not the items
brought onto Stannard’s land (i.e., the tyres) that had
escaped.41
Lord Etherton noted that it is necessary in cases involv-
ing such escapes (in this case of fire) to restate the
classic statement of Rylands v. Fletcher. However,
there is no consensus as to how this should be done. In
some of the fire cases it was regarded as sufficient that
the defendant brought onto his land something that
was (at the time) considered inherently dangerous,
such as a train42 or a car.43 In other cases, such as
29 ‘Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning’, in: The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006), paragraph 2.1.2, found at: <http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/
index.html#PreLayDowRul>.
30 Cambridge Water, n. 23 above, at 7.
31 Ibid.
32 Transco, n. 20 above, at paragraphs 8–9.
33 Healy v. Bray UDC, [1962/1963] 3 Ir Jur Rep 9; Mullen v. Forrester,
[1921] 2 IR 412.
34 Transco, n. 20 above, at paragraph 29.
35 Wildtree Hotels Ltd v. Harrow London Borough Council, [2001] 2
AC 1, at 8–9 (‘Wildtree Hotels’).
36 Mark Stannard (t/a Wyvern Tyres) v. Robert Raymond Harvey
Gore, [2012] EWCA Civ 1248.
37 ‘Wildtree Hotels’, n. 36 above, at paragraph 2.
38 Ibid., at paragraph 10.
39 Ibid., at paragraphs 22–23.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. at paragraphs 24–25.
42 Jones v. Festiniog Railway Company, [1868] LR 3 QB 733.
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Mason v. Levy Auto Parts of England Ltd,44 it was the
particular danger presented by the flammable nature of
the materials brought onto the land by the defendant
which was regarded as critical.
The rule in Rylands is recognized by many – notably
Binchy45 – as instituting a high threshold for claimants
to surmount. Coupled, in the context of environmental
actions, with the precautionary principle, and the
nature of fracking – itself a regulated activity in those
jurisdictions where it is performed – the application of
Rylands in the context of fracking may seem problem-
atic. However, it is contended that the decision in
Stannard may offer some insights into how the rule
might be revived.
It is clear from the dicta of Lord Hoffman in Transco
that there are only limited situations in which the rule
may be successfully pleaded. However, the ruling of the
court of first instance in Stannard, though overturned,
would seem to offer a potential for the requirements of
‘naturalness’ of land use and ‘danger’ to be severed by
allowing claims to succeed under Rylands, despite the
naturalness of land use not being in question. As such,
the heightened risk of the activity or use engaged in,
which led to damage pursuant to escape, would trigger
a successful use of the rule in an environmental law
context. Though Stannard relates to the escape of fire,
a similar view might apply to the use of the rule in
fracking – in which a license is granted to engage in the
activity, and the chemicals used may be naturally occur-
ring but due to the quantities and manner of their use
become unnatural, thus inviting the use of the rule in
Rylands.
The following section examines the case of Dimock,
Pennsylvania and American law relating to escape
of dangerous materials which cause damage, before
moving on to draw together the scenario presented by
this case study, and examining the regulatory context
and application of the rule in Rylands to fracking.
CASE STUDY: DIMOCK,
PENNSYLVANIA
In 2008, residents of Dimock, a town in northeastern
Pennsylvania in the United States, where fracking is
used by Cabot Oil and Gas to collect gas, reported their
water had turned brown and was staining crockery and
clothing. Residents in close proximity to fracking wells
also experienced dizziness while showering.46 Subse-
quent tests performed by the Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Protection (DEP) found elevated
levels of methane, iron and aluminium in the area’s
water supply.47 There were also allegations that inde-
pendent investigations had revealed levels of the
chemicals trimethylbenzene and toluene exceeding
maximum state standards in ground and drinking
water in the area.48 In nearby Susquehanna County,
barium, manganese and strontium were detected in
drinking water near fracking wells.49
Although methane and small amounts of other chemi-
cals in water are not geologically uncommon in certain
areas, including Pennsylvania, the DEP determined
that the methane in Dimock’s water supplies was ther-
mogenic rather than biogenic in origin, meaning it
came from the rock layers beneath the Earth’s surface
rather than from biological sources such as cattle, and
was therefore attributable to Cabot’s activity.50 The DEP
observed ‘bubbling gas and high pressure readings
from a number of wells that proved poor well construc-
tion, and excessive gas levels that could only exist in
wells that were leaking’.51
A year after these events, in 2009, a further series of
escapes of fracking fluid occurred in Dimock.52 The
well’s operator, Cabot, used hay bales and earth dams in
attempts to contain the spill and determined that
migration of the fluid to surface waters was unlikely.53
Nevertheless, the fluid reached and contaminated
nearby creeks and wetlands and two weeks later an
order was issued requiring Cabot to cease its fracking
operations.54
In the subsequent litigation, Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil &
Gas,55 the plaintiffs included strict liability among their
44 Mason v. Levy Auto Parts of England Ltd, [1967] 2 QB 530 per
MacKenna J, at 542.
45 W. Binchy, ‘Recent Developments in the Law of Torts’, 4:1 Judicial
Studies Institute Journal (2004), 8.
46 Fiorentino v Cabot & Gas Corp, 50 F.Supp. 2d. 506 (M.D. Pa. Nov.
15, 2010) (‘Fiorentino’).
47 C. Bateman, ‘A Colossal Fracking Mess’, Vanity Fair (21 June
2010), found at: <http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2010/
06/fracking-in-pennsylvania-201006>.
48 See Fiorentino, n. 46 above. These chemicals are also subject to
federal reporting requirements. Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act, 342 USC §313 (1986). Toluene and many of its
derivatives are also subject to the reporting requirements of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act, 40 CFR §302.4.
49 L.S. Rubin, ‘Frack to the Future: Considering a Strict Liability Stan-
dard for Hydraulic Fracturing Activities’, 3:1 George Washington
Journal of Energy and Environmental Law (2012), 117, at 121.
50 Press Release, Pennsylvania. Department of Environmental Pro-
tection, ‘DEP Secretary Issues Open Letter to Citizens of Susque-
hanna County Community Impacted by Ongoing Gas Migration
Issues’ (19 October 2010), found at: <http://www.portal.state.pa.us/
portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id=14827&typeid=1>.
51 See L.S. Rubin, n. 49 above, at 120.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., at 118. See also URS Corporation, Engineering Study (2009),
found at: <http://www.pressconnects.com/assets/pdf/CB1446181016
.PDF>, at 1–3.
54 Cabot, however, was allowed to resume operations three weeks
later. Subsequently, the DEP ordered Cabot to install water treatment
systems in several homes and permanently close three wells.
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causes of action, alleging that the chemicals used in
fracking fluid are abnormally dangerous. Cabot filed a
motion to dismiss the strict liability cause of action for
failure to state a claim upon which relief might be
granted, arguing that the Superior Court of Pennsylva-
nia had held, as a matter of law, that petroleum-related
storage and transmission activities are not abnormally
dangerous or ultra hazardous.56 The plaintiffs counter-
contended there was no precedent pertaining to the
drilling and operation of gas wells. The judge agreed
with the plaintiffs and declined to dismiss the cause of
action for strict liability.57 Relying on precedents con-
cerning fracking in the county – namely Berish v.
Southwestern Energy Production Co.58 – the court con-
cluded that ‘the determination of whether or not an
activity is abnormally dangerous is fact-intensive’.59
The Dimock case establishes a promising precedent for
use in other common law jurisdictions in Europe
through its invocation of the language of abnormally
dangerous activities and escape. Although the United
States has not and did not explicitly embrace the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher as in the United Kingdom and other
commonwealth countries,60 the judgments in both
Berish and Fiorentino would furnish persuasive
authority61 for the use of the rule in the context of
fracking in Europe.
Courts in Oregon, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Washing-
ton have also concluded that strict liability concepts
may apply to ‘inherently’ or ‘abnormally’ dangerous
activities carried out on lands which then damage
neighbouring property, though they have also not
invoked the rule in Rylands directly.62 An Oregon court
applied strict liability to pesticide drift in the 1961 case
of Loe v. Lenhardt63 – a judgment reaffirmed in the
1977 case of Bella v. Aurora Air.64 The case involved the
spraying of 24-D, a pesticide, over broad-leafed crops.65
The court stated: ‘[I]f the activity could be carried out
only with a substantially and uncontrollable likelihood
that the damage will occur the activity could be classi-
fied as abnormally dangerous.’66
Notwithstanding the financial and industrial consider-
ations that, arguably, make fuel extraction more neces-
sary than crop dusting due to its lack of viable
alternatives the escape of fracking fluids presents a situ-
ation at least as perilous as the storage of water in large
quantities or aerial spreading of pesticide warranting
its classification as an ultra-hazardous activity under
the rule in Rylands.
For the past 65 years, courts in the United States have
refused to apply the common law ad coelunz doctrine,
which states that ownership is the same on, above, and
below the surface.67 This rejection has created a legal
regime in which courts generally do not apply the law of
trespass to oil and gas cases unless harm takes place on
the surface. In Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation v. Garza
Energy Trust,68 the Texas Supreme Court found that
trespass would apply if chemicals were spilled on the
surface, but held that subsurface fracking did not con-
stitute trespass. Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court
held in Crawford v. Hrabe69 that a well operator had
the right to inject salt water into the ground to increase
production and that this injection was not a trespass.70
In Crawford, as in Garza,71 the Kansas Supreme Court,
in holding for the defendants, referred to the economi-
cally beneficial nature of drilling.72 However, in Starrh
Cotton Growers v. Area Energy,73 a Californian court
held migration of water from an energy company’s
drilling activities onto cotton-growers’ land was a con-
tinuing sub-surface trespass.74 Similarly, in Beck v
Northern Natural Gas Co,75 the Tenth Circuit held that56 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Fiorentino, ibid., at 1.
57 Ibid.
58 Berish v. Southwestern Energy Production Co., 2011 WL 382420
(MD Pa. 3 February 2011).
59 Ibid.
60 This is largely attributed to the historical context of the rule devel-
opment in Europe, which took place in the context of mining. This was
an industry on which the United States was highly dependent at the
time of the rules’ emergence, discouraging the adoption of rules in the
United States for fear of a ‘chilling effect’ on business and industry.
See F.C. Woodside III, M.L. Silbersack, T.L. Fliehman and D.J.
Feichtner, ‘Why Absolute Liability under Rylands v. Fletcher is Abso-
lutely Wrong!’, 29:1 Dayton Law Review (2003), 1.
61 Under common law, previous decisions of higher courts in the
jurisdiction are considered binding precedent pursuant to which lower
courts are bound to decide. By contrast, foreign precedents or those
of lower courts are considered to carry only persuasive authority and
courts are not required to consider nor decide in accordance with
such decisions. See R. Byrne and P. McCutcheon, Byrne and
McCutcheon on the Irish Legal System, 5th edn (Bloomsbury, 2009),
at 403.
62 Bella v. Aurora Air Inc., 279 Or. 13, 566 P 2d 489 (1977); Gotreaux
v. Gary, 232 La 373, 94 So 2d 293 (1957); Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d
829 (Okla. 1961).
63 Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961).
64 See Bella v Aurora Air Inc., n. 62 above.
65 C.A. Kennedy, ‘Liability in the Aerial Application of Pesticides’, 22:1
South Dakota Law Review (1977), 75. See also Boroughs v. Joiner,
337 So. 2d 340 (Ala. 1976) and Christensen v. Midstate Aerial Appli-
cators Corp, 166 N.W.2d 386 (ND 1969).
66 See Bella v Aurora Air Inc., n. 62 above, at paragraph 24.
67 United States v. Causby, 328 US 256 (1946).
68 Coastal Oil and Gas Corp USA v. Garza Energy Trust et al., No.
05-0466, 2008 WL 3991029 (Tex. 29 August 2008) (‘Coastal Oil and
Gas Corp USA’).
69 Steve Crawford, S&M Oil Company v. Marvin Hrabe, Bruce Krob,
Lucille Rogers and Patricia Irey (2002) Kan Sup Ct No 87/624 (‘Steve
Crawford, S&M Oil Company’).
70 Ibid.
71 See Justice Willett’s concurrence in Coastal Oil and Gas Corp
USA, n. 68 above.
72 See Steve Crawford, S&M Oil Company, n. 69 above, at paragraph
7.
73 Starrh & Starrh Cotton Growers v. Area Energy LLC, [2007] Sup.
Ct. No. CV 245287.
74 Ibid., at 26.
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there was sufficient evidence for a lower court to con-
clude that the migration of gas from one subsurface
formation to another was a trespass.76
Finding a common thread in these cases that could have
directly appreciable persuasive authority in European
common law jurisdictions is difficult. In cases such as
Crawford and Garza, courts have adopted a broad
interpretation of the rights of mineral lessees and
allowed continuation of activities such as underground
injection due, in part, to the economic benefits in which
they result. Conversely, in cases like Starrh and Beck,
courts have held companies responsible for the conse-
quences of water and gas migration. In light of such
conflicting rulings, the availability of strict liability
under the rule in Rylands, as used in Cabot Oil and
Gas, may prove an adept legal tool in cases involving
surface and subsurface escape and pollution of water
and land.
The ambiguous status of the ad coelunz doctrine, as
well as the exemptions fracking currently enjoys from
provisions of major national statutes in the United
States, including the Clean Air Act,77 Clean Water Act78
and Safe Drinking Water Act,79 leaves significant doubt
around the ability of individuals to recover damages
through traditional legal avenues in situations such as
in Dimock.80 Furthermore, if the risks of fracking are
as low as its proponents claim, such disparities in
fracking’s treatment under American legislation are
unnecessary; it should be held to standards equal to
similar industries.
APPLYING THE RULE IN RYLANDS
This section examines how current legislative and regu-
latory provisions are insufficient to cover fracking
activities, and how Rylands may be invoked by refer-
ence to Ireland where the rule arguably enjoyed the
most sustained support and where shale deposits have
been located and are the subject of local criticism from
public representatives.81 The section first considers the
existing legal provisions applicable to fracking. It then
examines how the rule in Rylands might be invoked in
the context of fracking fluids by examining the case law
of the jurisdiction which offers binding precedential
authority as well as those of other jurisdictions which
offer persuasive authority.
In 2011, three companies were granted two-year petro-
leum licensing options by the Irish Department of Com-
munications, Energy and Natural Resources in the
midwest and northwest of Ireland. The licenses are for
the potential extraction of the deposits of shale gas in
those regions through fracking. If fracking were to be
undertaken pursuant to such a license at a later date, an
integrated pollution prevention control license under
the Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992 would
be required and the area would be subject to an envi-
ronmental impact assessment.82 Historically, activities
held to pose unreasonable risks to the community,
which were therefore heavily regulated or precluded,
include the storage of explosives, blasting and crop
dusting.
In Ireland, three local authorities – the counties of
Leitrim, Clare and Roscommon – have sought to ban
fracking by including prohibitions in their develop-
ment plans. However, Convery and Scannell83 have
noted fundamental difficulties with this approach, as
it is potentially illegal following the precedent in
Glencar v. Mayo County Council,84 in which the court
found that a ban on mining previously implemented
by Mayo County Council under its development plan
was unlawful.85
The situation in the United States where fracking is
currently banned or allowed on a state-by-state basis
will hardly be appropriate in the Irish context, in which
environmental policy is set and enforced nationally.
However until such time as there is such national policy
or legislation, rather than the tacit acceptance of
fracking, it would appear that, as in Glencar, local
authorities retain the authority to make decisions on
grants of permission for such activities in accordance
with their development plans and applicable adminis-
trative law standards.
Convery and Scannell have further noted that explora-
tion for fuel sources enjoys cross-party support and is
essential if Ireland is to reduce its 86% dependence
on imported energy. Thus, although fracking may be
unpopular among the public, this may be outweighed
by political will to generate economic capital. The gov-
ernment enjoys the liberty to adopt an approach similar
to that taken in other European jurisdictions and issue
a moratorium or ban on fracking. Until it does so, those
76 Ibid.
77 Clean Air Act, 42 USC §§7401ff. (1970).
78 Clean Water Act, 33 USC §§1251ff. (1972).
79 Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 USC §300ff. (1974).
80 See comments by M. Brume, Executive Director of the Sierra Club,
found at: <http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/934>.
81 M. Hennessy and D. Keenan, ‘Tax Breaks Encourage Search for
Shale Gas; Exploration’, Irish Times (21 March 2013).
82 D. Healy, Hydraulic Fracturing or ‘Fracking’: A Short Summary of
Current Knowledge and Potential Environmental Impacts (Environ-
mental Protection Agency 2012); and ‘No “Fracking” until Further
Study, Says Rabbitte’, Irish Times (14 May 2012).
83 F. Convery and Y. Scannell, ‘Fracking and Local Credibility in
Ireland’ (30 May 2012), found at: <http://www.irishenvironment.com/
commentary/frank-convery-and-yvonne-scannell-fracking-and-local-
credibility-in-ireland>.

























































































































RECIEL •• (••) 2014 REVIVING RYLANDS
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
7
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 8 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Tue Jan 21 18:58:02 2014
/Xpp84/wiley_journal/REEL/reel_v0_i0/reel_12059update
engaged in prospecting for natural resources are
entitled to have their cases assessed by qualified State
bodies on the basis of environmental risk and relevant
legal considerations. Unless and until the Oireachtas86
takes such actions, there is no power, at a local political




The Petroleum and Other Minerals Act
The policy of successive Irish governments in relation
to the extraction of fossil fuels has been to endeavour to
attract international corporations to undertake explo-
ration activities.88 Under the Petroleum and Other
Minerals Act 1960, both oil and gas are defined as
‘petroleum’,89 meaning that fracking activities could
presumptively be encompassed by existing legislation.
However, difficulties could emerge in relation to impos-
ing liability and claiming compensation for damage
under the Act in circumstances where leaks of frack-
ing liquids polluted neighbouring property. The Act
imposes liability on the holder of a permit for the
exploitation of petroleum90 who causes nuisance or
damage to surface land or water through their work91 on
site. However, it makes no express provision for claims
by neighbouring property owners and does not provide
for compensation.92
While such an omission (liability without provision for
compensation) may be politically advantageous in pro-
viding a degree of superficial assurance for an industry
seeking to temporarily locate and explore in Ireland, as
well as those who could immediately envisage them-
selves as claimants, it also creates ambiguity and
uncertainty relating to damages and signals a lack of
transparency unwelcome in the modern regulatory
State. Should fracking begin in Ireland, further regula-
tory and legislative provisions taking adequate account
of the associated risks and protective measures would
thus be required.
EU Environmental Liability Directive
Directive 2004/35 on Environmental Liability93 estab-
lishes a framework based on the polluter pays prin-
ciple94 to prevent and remedy measurable direct or
indirect damage to European sites (and any other sites
designated by Member States), water and soil.
However, the Directive does not directly address
damage to persons or property. Furthermore, indi-
vidual Member States may afford defences deemed
appropriate to operators under Annex III (that are oth-
erwise strictly liable), leading to a situation in which the
Directive could be transposed in a sufficiently industry-
orientated manner so as to make it challenging to
succeed in claims for environmental damage.
Under the Directive, the operator whose occupational
activity causes the imminent threat or occurrence of
environmental damage is liable for the costs incurred
in carrying out the preventive or remedial measures
required as a result of the threat or damage.95 However,
as the Environmental Liability Directive deals only with
‘pure ecological damage’ and is based on administrative
penalties as distinct from a civil liability system such as
that generally covered under the law of tort, it is unclear
whether individual property owners affected would be
afforded redress under its auspices. Thus, a need for a
means of seeking a remedy for damage to property not
covered by the Directive or its implementing legislation
remains. This means of redress may be found by
employing the rule in Rylands.
REVIVING RYLANDS
As evidenced by the decision in Glencar, as well as the
national and European legislative provisions outlined
above, fracking in Ireland remains largely unregulated,
with provisions for its regulation implicitly provided for
at best and little certainty as to the manner in which
damage to property might be redressed should its use
commence. In seeking to regulate fracking in the future,
the precautionary principle may perhaps offer the most
prudent standard of guidance for the development and
use of fracking. The principle states that if an action or
policy is suspected of presenting a risk of harm to the
public or the environment then, in the absence of full
scientific certainty, the burden of proof shall fall on
those seeking to engage in the activity to disprove sus-
pecting deleterious effects per Article 191.2 of the
TFEU.96 The principle has, through its application in86 The Irish legislature.
87 See F. Convery and Y. Scannell, n. 83 above.
88 See: <http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/Natural/>.
89 Irish Petroleum and Other Minerals Act 1960, n. 15 above, Section
2.1 reads: ‘any mineral, oil or relative hydrocarbon and natural gas
and other liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons and their derivatives or
constituent substances existing in its natural condition in strata and
includes any other mineral substance contained in and natural gas
brought to the surface with them in the normal process of extraction’.
90 Ibid., Section 28.1.
91 Ibid., Section 16.1–2.
92 Ibid., Section 35.
93 Directive 2004/35/CE of 21 April 2004 on Environmental Liability
with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental
Damage, [2004] OJ L143/56.
94 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union, [2010] OJ C83/47, Article 191.2.
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case law – notably in the cases of Pfizer97 and Dutch
Vitamins98 – become a ‘general principle of EU law’.99
It is clear from Dutch Vitamins that in exercising their
discretion relating to the protection of public health,
Member States must comply with the principle of pro-
portionality. The case suggests that, following a risk
assessment, if the Member State finds a likelihood of
real harm then, based on the precautionary principle, it
can ban a good or activity. In the Irish context, the
environmental legislation currently in place requires
that development plans drawn up by local authorities
adequately assess the risks, pursuant to which an envi-
ronmental impact assessment may be required.100
While the precautionary principle may offer guidance
for best practices in new regulation or legislation at a
national or European level, in cases where fracking is in
use it offers little succour to those whose property is
damaged through escapes of fracking fluids. The best
means of redress, which this article has identified, is the
revival of the rule in Rylands for application in situa-
tions in which such escapes and damages do occur. The
rule in Rylands has been accepted and applied by the
Irish courts – notably in Superquinn v. Bray UDC101 –
and has been deemed to include, within the scope of the
non-natural use requirement, escapes of methane from
landfills,102 escapes of large volumes of water,103 storage
of large quantities or of smaller individual quantities on
a large scale, of chemicals,104 and sewage.105 Although
the case of Hanrahan v. Merck Sharp and Dohme106
might seem to present an impediment to the revival of
Rylands, it is contended that Hanrahan should be dis-
tinguished on its facts and is thus not applicable to the
use of the rule in relation to fracking. The distinguish-
ing facts centre on problems faced by the plaintiffs in
the case in establishing causation and escape. The
plaintiffs’ claims under Rylands rested primarily on the
alleged air pollution by emissions from the defendant’s
factory, yet establishing both escape and causation
proved impossible under Rylands. In the case of
fracking, where escape and damage are clearly evi-
denced by soil and water samples containing unaccept-
able quantities of chemicals outside the defendant’s
land, such impediments are surmountable.
The difficulty experienced by the plaintiffs in
Hanrahan in establishing causation, and thus proving
that the ill health and damage they suffered was due to
the defendant’s activities, was central to the failure of a
cause under Rylands in that case. By contrast, as evi-
denced in cases such as Fiorentino, in the event of the
escape of fracking fluids the presence of the dangerous
element is easily established and its effect more easily
appreciable. Such precedents that deem the escape
of water and methane accumulations to fall under
Rylands offer promising potential for the application
of the rule in cases where fracking fluid escapes
and causes damage. While the English precedents of
Transco and Stannard would indicate – for that juris-
diction – a decline in the judiciary’s regard of the rule,
in Ireland both judgements enjoy only persuasive
authority before the courts. In the presence of Ameri-
can cases, such as Fiorentino, which offer persuasive
authority, the case for the revival of Rylands in Ireland
remains open.
CONCLUSION
In summer 2013, British Chancellor of the Exchequer
George Osborne announced major tax breaks to
encourage early investment in shale gas exploration in
the United Kingdom following the positive economic
impacts of the shale gas boom on the American gas
industry and its reduction in fuel prices.107 Osborne pro-
jected that, by July 2013, the United Kingdom Depart-
ment for Energy and Climate Change would produce
detailed rules to govern exploration for the shale gas
discovered in Northern Ireland, Lancashire and south-
ern England. The announcement came soon after a
company exploring in Lancashire withdrew its planning
application delaying drilling by a year following mild
tremors that occurred in the area following fracking
activity.
The provision of fuel is of high and increasing social and
economic value, yet such benefits must be weighed
against the associated risks inherent in the production
process. Modern technology has not dealt effectively
with accidental spillage – a risk that would appear to be
97 ECJ, Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health v. Council, [2002] ECR
II-3305, at paragraph 149. In that case the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) established that ‘risk assessment includes for the competent
public authority . . . a two-fold task . . . first, determining what level of
risk is deemed unacceptable and, second, conducting a scientific
assessment of the risks’. Ibid. It is thus for the Community institutions
to determine the level of protection which they deem appropriate for
society and by reference to that level of protection they must then
determine the level of risk based on available scientific knowledge.
98 ECJ, Case C-41/02, Commission v. Netherlands (Dutch Vitamins),
[2004] ECR I-11375.
99 M.A. Recuerda Girela, ‘Risk and Reason in the European Union
Law’, 1:5 European Food and Feed Law Review (2006), 270.
100 Irish Planning and Development Act 2000, found at: <http://
www.irishstatutebook.ie/2000/en/act/pub/0030/>, Articles 3, 4.1 and
4.2.
101 Superquinn v. Bray UDC, [1998] 3 IR 542.
102 Gertsen v. Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, [1973] DLR (3d)
641.
103 Dockery v. Manor Park Homebuilders Ltd, High Court 10 April
1995 (O’Hanlon J). Cf. Poplar Homes Ltd v. Society of African Mis-
sions Trustees, [1997] Ir L Log W 367 (Laffroy J).
104 Cambridge Water, n. 23 above.
105 Smeaton v. Ilford Corporation, [1954] Ch 450.
106 Hanrahan v. Merck Sharpe and Dohme (Ireland) Ltd, [1988] IESC
1.
107 ‘There’s Gold in Them There Wells’, The Economist (21 December
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increasing with the emergence of fracking whose pro-
duction process carries a high risk of accidental dis-
charges. The explosion at the BP Deepwater Horizon
well in the Gulf of Mexico during 2010 intensified calls
for sweeping changes in American energy and environ-
mental law and regulation, and heightened global calls
for reform of fuel extraction. However, the wide-
ranging changes the incident promised to precipitate
have yet to transpire and momentum has, conversely,
shifted to a more permissive regime of aggressive oil
and gas development with the former regulatory
scheme largely intact.
The failure to adapt to changing fuel extraction tech-
nologies is unsurprising, as the prevailing legal and
policy architecture is designed to withstand changing
circumstances, even those as extreme as the BP
blowout. Changing or improving safety and environ-
mental stewardship practices, requires concerted and
focused action that may only take root after repeated
future disasters.108 Ireland, which relies so heavily on its
natural landscape and environment to attract tourism
as well as its industry-friendly policies to attract invest-
ment from multinationals, as well as numerous Ameri-
can industries, can ill-afford to suffer from such an
imbalance in environmental protection and industrial
soft-touch regulation, either in exploiting fuel reserves
through traditional methods or through increased use
of fracking.
A revival of the rule in Rylands has the potential to
maintain the current industry-friendly standards, while
providing a powerful deterrent against irresponsible
practices through the threat of both monetary and
reputational damage. This may serve as the most mutu-
ally acceptable resolution to popular fears of damage
that cannot be easily remedied before the courts.
The private sector plays a crucial role in the exploitation
of the global commons yet its actions also harbour the
potential to adversely affect the local and global envi-
ronment and thus the person and property of citi-
zens.109 As more knowledge and understanding is
gained in respect of the benefits and risks posed by fuel
extraction, national legal and regulatory frameworks
must evolve to reflect the rights and responsibility that
the parties involved bear. In light of the current absence
of explicit regulations, the Rylands rule provides an
indispensible tool for those whose use and enjoyment of
their land and health is jeopardized or damaged by
non-accidental environmental contamination subse-
quent to fracking.
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108 M. Davis, ‘Lessons Unlearned: The Legal and Policy Legacy of the
BP Deep-water Horizon Spill’, 3:2 Washington and Lee Journal of
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(ed.), Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Changes: Per-
spectives from Science Sociology and the Law (Cambridge University





















































































RÓISÍN ÁINE COSTELLO RECIEL •• (••) 2014
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
10
